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Industrial funding of research in universities is
not new. Philanthropic support of basic research
and investment in the development of commercial
products such as nylon have generally been re-
garded as beneficial to both society and industry.
In these instances, the universities consider that
they have served both well and with no loss in
integrity. Other university-developed technologies,
such as a number of chemical pesticides, have
been viewed with mixed blessings.' Recent in-
creased industrial support in biotechnology, mi-
croelectronics, and automation now raises addi-
tional concerns.
Industry currently spends $250-$300 million
per year on research and development in uni-
versities.' Edward David, President of Exxon Re-
search and Engineering, recommends tripling this
figure over the next ten years because he regards
it to be "economically and socially desirable,"
and because "fine science and technique created
in academia [are] not effectively coupled to the
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nation's commercial innovation system.r" David
argues that such actions should be construed as
research support "consistent with.a commercial
'mission.": not as "industrial philanthropy," but
he then goes on to recommend that industry
funding of more fundamental research, rather than
of more applied, would reap commercial benefits
in the long run.
If advice such as this were followed, industrial
funding would increase from its present level of
4 percent of what the Federal government currently
provides to about 15 percent." These aggregate
figures are sometimes cited to support the view
that because industrial funding of research is such
a small part of the universities' total income, con-
cern for excessive or serious influence is unwar-
ranted. However, the relative distribution of in-
dustrial and government support varies from
institution to institution. At MIT, for example,
industry-funded research has more than tripled
in the past five years, growing from $6.7 million
in the 1977-1978 academic year to $20.3 million
in 1981-1982, while total Federal support has
grown at about 10 percent per year, from $102
million in 1977-1978 to $157 million in 1981-
1982.5
The distribution of industrial support also varies
across scientific disciplines. A New York Uni-
versity study of 465 industry-supported research
programs indicates that 67 percent were in en-
gineering and computer sciences and 14 percent
were in biotechnology." The National'Science
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is currently compiling a profile of industry in-
volvement by field. As expected, the distribution
of support is not spread evenly across fields. Thus,
any inquiry into the effects of industrial funding
on the university must necessarily go deeper than
aggregate impressions reveal.
In The Divided Academy, Everett Carll Ladd,
[r., and Seymour Martin Lipset show that the
disciplines most aligned with conservative political
ideas and favorable to the private sector are en-
gineering, medicine, and chemistry. The disciplines
most removed from these views are the social
sciences, 'physics, and mathematics.7 Edward
David, in citing this work, notes that this polarity
is reflected sharply in the profile of industrial
funding. I! And, "unlike the commercialization of
biotechnology," one journalist observes, the
"growing corporate role [for developments in mi-
croelectronics] in engineering schools has so far
been accompanied by little controversy or aca-
demic soul-searching.t" He offers the explanation
that "electrical engineers and computer scientists
have long had close relationships with industry,"
a suggestion that parallels David's expectation
that academics in engineering, medicine, and
chemistry are kindly disposed towards industrial
goals.
These facts and observations are beginning to
raise concerns in both academic and industrial
communities. Vigorous discussions about the
university-industry relationship have taken place
in each university contemplating new large con-
tractual arrangements for private support of bio-
technology. The national controversy around these
concerns also stimulated the Office of Technology
Assessment to undertake a serious examination
of industrial-academic relationships in biotech-
nology at eight major universities; the final report
from that study is due to be transmitted to the
Congress in March. In the 1981 Annual Science
'& Technology Report to the Congress, the Pres-
ident's Office of Science and Technology Policy
and the National Science Foundation give prom-
inence to the issue of industry-university co-
operation in genetic engineering.l" Two major
conferences involving university and industry also
were held in the last nine months, one a closed
conference at Pajaro Dunes, California," in March
1982, and the other an open conference in
Philadelphia'f in December 1982.
These two conferences, although stimulated by
the controversies surrounding biotechnology, did
address much broader issues. For example, a
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statement issued by the conferees at the Pajaro
Dunes meeting observes that:
These problems center on the preservation of the
independence and integrity of the university and
its faculty, bothfaced with unprecedented financial
pressuresand complexcommercial relationships.
... The overriding concern of the participants
was to explore effective ways to satisfy the uni-
versity community and the public that research
agreements and other arrangements with industry
be so constructed as not to promote a secrecy
that will harm the progress of science, impair the
educational experience of students and post-
doctoral fellows, diminishthe roleofthe university
as a credible and impartial resource, interfere with
the choice by faculty members of the scientific
questions they pursue, or divert the energies of
faculty members and the resources of the uni-
versity from its primary educationaland research
missions.13
A. Bartlett Giamatti, President of Yale University
and a keynote speaker at the Philadelphia con-
ference, notes in an article in Science that "the
university exists to protect and foster an envi-
ronment conducive to free inquiry, the advance-
ment of knowledge, and the free exchange of ideas."
He argues that arrangements for industrial support
of research must preserve these basic functions. 14
Beyond biotechnology, serious criticisms are also
levied at industrial support of university research
in both microelectronics and chemistry. David
Noble, for example, has expressed concern about
the possible undue influence of the chemical in-
dustry on universities and about the appropriate-
ness of university assistance for developing in-
dustrial technology that threatens to displace
labor. IS
Writing in Harper's magazine, Wayne Biddle
has pointed out two other critical issues. He first
describes the examples of large contractual ar-
rangements at MIT and Harvard, but then argues
that "the real perversion of academic independence
may occur through the collective impact of many
smaller ties.,,16 Furthermore, he observes, the
question "is not whether academic freedom and
the quality of education are being maintained,
but whether the problems of society are being
solved." The Pajaro Dunes and Philadelphia con-
ferences defined the issues and controversies in
a different way and gave relatively little attention
to these points-but they are being addressed in
other arenas. One of the most interesting dis-
cussions surrounds the American Civil Liberties
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Union (ACLU) effort to draft a revision of its 1970
Policy 64 on the University and Contract re-
search." The ACLU is particularly sensitive to
the dangers of skewing or distorting what it views
as the universities' threefold mission of teaching,
research, and public service.
Because the. issues at stake in industry-
university arrangements go beyond the separate
controversies, this essay seeks (1) to categorize
the kinds of research undertaken at academic in-
stitutions, (2) to examine the idea of the university
as a place dedicated to free inquiry, as a repository
of diverse interests and views, and as an institution
that seeks to meet societal needs, and (3) to identify
the values in need of preservation. The framework
presented in this paper is offered to untangle the
rhetoric of criticism and its rebuttal, rather than
to settle the question of whether or not academic
freedom is being compromised in a particular in-
stance. That framework necessarily involves ex-
ploring the incentive structure that determines
the scope, content, and dissemination of the results
of scientific and technical research; assessing how
the relevant incentives might be affected by in-
dustry funding; and examining how these con-
straints may affect academic freedom.
Two caveats should be noted at the outset. First,
this essay does not flow from an "idealized" view
of the university. The university is not, and perhaps
never has been, a pristine institution. Academic
inquiry within the university is clearly subject to
a variety of constraints from within and without,
and academic freedom is never a fully realized
objective. Government funding certainly provides
a major potential for skewing research and teach-
ing, albeit possibly in very different ways. The
key task here, then, is to examine the potential
impact of industrial funding on this already im-
perfect structure. It is important to ask in what
ways industrial funding of scientific and technical
research moves us toward a more fully realized
academic freedom, and in what ways it moves us
away from this goal. Paul Gray, President of MIT,
while not unmindful of the dangers, argues that
industrial support helps offset the uncertainties
of government support, lends temporal stability
to research, and allows the university to be more
relevant to society." Other observers emphasize
the possible risks.
A second caveat concerns the nature of the
analysis presented in this paper. Concerns about
industrial funding come under two headings: those
which stem from obvious conflicts of interest with
their origin in the stated differing objectives of
academe and industry, and those which are more
subtle, less measurable, or even impossible to dis-
cern in the particular case. Examples of the first
type are openness vs. secrecy in research, patent
ownership, exclusive vs. non-exclusive licensing
of patentable technology, or equity position in
the sponsoring source, etc. These issues were ex-
tensively debated in both the major conferences
mentioned above. The conferences ended in great
optimism that these sticky problems could be
solved in a spirit of cooperation. And they probably
can. The other type of problem includes the less
tangible issues such as the accusation that im-
portant activities in the university-e.g., the choice
of research projects, the actual performance of the
research, the directing and educating of students,
and the expression of views critical of industry-
will be skewed or distorted. Because success at
reaching an accommodation on the first set of
important concerns may lessen the necessary vig-
ilance on the second set, I have chosen to con-
centrate on the latter. I am not dealing here with
"hard" data, or with particularly easy or obvious
examples. Accordingly, my essay involves certain
assumptions about the underlying motivations of
those who make decisions in academe about re-
search and teaching and it is appropriate to ac-
knowledge that different assumptions may well
lead to different conclusions.
Academic Freedom and the Nature of
the University
Few people would argue with the assertion that,
as a matter of principle, the university should
foster academic freedom. Consensus on the proper
definition of academic freedom may be more dif-
ficult to secure.
In its classical sense, "academic freedom" simply
represented the freedom of scholars to pursue
knowledge without constraint. While this is a
useful starting point, it is insufficient to describe
the complexity of the modern university. Uni-
versities have long accepted constraints on their
pursuit of knowledge; academic research, writing,
and teaching all bear the mark of outside influence.
In theory this is perfectly appropriate. T~ respond
to and serve the public need, the university must
look beyond pure intellectual inquiry. A modern
definition of academic freedom, then, must in-
corporate the natural interplay between the uni-
versity and the society.
Figure 1.
• An additional type of research is that undertaken for mil-
itary purposes. This important topic deserves extensive dis-
cussion, but is beyond the scope of this essay.
In the context of science and technology, "ac-
ademic freedom" can be described as the freedom
to pursue research which may be categorized into
four types: intellectual inquiry conducted within
existing paradigms; intellectual inquiry that chal-
lenges existing paradigms; inquiry directed pri-
marily at the socioeconomic or political conse-
quences of science and technology (i.e., technology
assessment); and inquiry directed at producing
forseeable commercial value. In this essay, research
is intended to include a variety of related activities
from the education of students in the research
efforts to the communication of the results. The
first two of these types of research might be de-
scribed as "basic" research; the latter two, as
"applied" research.· For the purposes of discussion,
the four kinds of research may be graphically pre-
sented as shown in Figure 1.
The left side of the figure encompasses inquiries
that grow out of healthy intellectual curiosity and
represent the pursuit of knowledge for its own
sake. As Thomas Kuhn notes in The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions." two kinds of academic
endeavor may take place within this framework
of inquiry: scholars whose pursuit of knowledge
leads them to build upon existing paradigms, and
others whose pursuit leads them to challenge di-
rectly these existing paradigms. Kuhn has em-
phasized the value assumptions underlying science
.and the natural resistance to change. Where there
is true academic freedom, both paths of inquiry
will flourish, and our fund of knowledge will grow
as a result.
The right side of the figure describes the more
direct relationship between the university and the
society at large, exhibiting the university's efforts








Inquiry directed at assess-
ing socio-economic or po-
litical consequences of sci-
ence and technology.
(Technology Assessment)
Inquiry directed at com-
mercial outcomes
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are directed at assessing particular social or po-
litical outcomes, such as effects on health, the
environment, employment, political power, and
the distribution of economic resources. They in-
clude part of what is done as technology assess-
ment or science policy research. In essence, it is
research where the rate of return is measured in
terms of social investment rather than pecuniary
profit. Traditionally, the government funds much
of this work, although industry itself is an im-
portant contributor. The second kind of "applied"
academic endeavor is directed at a particular com-
mercial outcome, and may be research designed
to create a new product or technology, or to im-
prove an old one. The act of classifying research
into one of these categories becomes an important
part of the debate. For example, whether research
in biotechnology should be considered basic or
applied has been clouded by the Supreme Court
decision, Diamond v. Chakrabarty (447U.S.303),
which allowed a developerto patent new life forms.
Obviously, these four categories cannot be drawn
with precision. Dividing lines will often fade, and
overlap will certainly occur; the distinction be-
tween basic and applied research will not always
be meaningful. Evaluation of the toxicity of a
chemical, for example, could be inspired just as
well by scientific curiosity as by a concern for
social impact. The close association between the
two categories of applied research also gives rise
to definitional difficulty. Without question, as-
sessing the political or socioeconomic conse-
quences of science and technology will have a
commercial effect, just as every commercial ac-
tivity will have a corresponding social effect. These
four categories are useful, however, in distin-
guishing the primary motivation behind the ac-
ademic inquiry.
In this century, we have seen a shift from the
left side of the figure to the right side. Driven by
the changes in the nature of government and pri-
vate funding, universities have concentrated more
and more on the "applied" side of academic in-
quiry. More recently, increased industry funding
of university research has begun a more intensive
movement toward applied research with more
immediate commercial return. It is the effect of
this movement, then, that is receiving attention.
In large part, how one assesses this effect depends
upon how one perceives the nature of the uni-
versity in general. It may well be unrealistic to
assume that the university could be, or should
be, "impartial" or a repository of neutral com-
petence. Biases find their way into academic work,
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although the imprint of bias is not always obvious.
Any academic inquiry, including scientific and
technical research, involves a multitude of choices
among competing interests, methodologies, and
viewpoints. It is the extraordinary academician
who can avoid his or her own personal beliefs in
making those choices; most cannot. To look
merely to the effect of industry funding on neu-
trality, then, is to miss its true impact on academic
freedom. Further, science itself is not neutral.
Harvey Brooks argues that "professional expertise
may carry with it value premises with implications
going well beyond the purely technical 'facts' in
a given situation, and that consequently the po-
litical neutrality of expert analyses cannot be taken
for granted. ,,20
How then does one measure the health of ac-, ,
ademic freedom within the university? It appears
much more instructive to look at the extent to
which a university permits a meaningful diversity
of viewpoints. True academic freedom-the free-
dom to pursue academic inquiry in all four cat-
egories-will necessarily generate a rich variety
of opinions and approaches. Rather than fostering
a neutral viewpoint, the university should properly
foster a multiplicity of viewpoints, since it is
through the interplay of opposing ideas that the
quality of academic work-and thus its ultimate
social value-is enhanced and refined. The right
to dissent is not meaningfully encouraged, in fact
may be endangered, in an institution unless there
are visible signs that diversity is safe. Thus a
multiplicity of research and courses must be se-
curely based. This is ensured by the existence of
the actual research and courses, not by mere
expressions of openness.
To be meaningful, the multiplicity of ideas
should exist on many levels-not only in a variety
of academic or paradigmatic viewpoints, but a
variety of social and political viewpoints as well.
In the context of scientific and technical research,
the university should encourage diversity of
thought in both the evaluation of technological
efficacy and the evaluation of the social impact
of technology.
Academic facilities and talent, however, are
scarce resources; their use for one purpose nec-
essarily reduces the pool of talent and facilities
available for other purposes. The opportunity cost
of using resources to pursue a particular avenue
of research, then, is that they are not available
to pursue other routes. Whether industrial funding
will quell or encourage a diversity of viewpoints
may be determined by the incentives that control
the nature and direction of academic research.
Industry Funding and the Incentives to
Undertake Research
Academicians are faced with an identifiable set
of choices regarding any research they contemplate
pursuing. The choices made will depend in large
part on an identifiable set of incentives and con-
straints on academic behavior. It is important to
understand how industrial funding can determine
the research choices, and then for each project to
decide whether funding is appropriate.
The Making of a Research Project
In general, five fundamental decisions must be
made during the course of a research project. The
first, of course, is the choice of the general category
of research to be pursued. Will an engineer, for
example, focus on developing new technologies
for automation or investigate the effects of au-
tomation on labor or work organizaiion! A second
related decision is the choice of the specific project.
If one decides to develop a commercial technology,
for example, a number of different kinds of tech-
nology can be pursued; will the research develop
chemical pesticides or biological pest control
methods?
After the project has been chosen, one must
then determine the manner and methodology of
research. If the research will examine toxicity,
for instance, should there be short-term or long-
term animal assays? Will the researchers look at
in vitro mutagenicity, or explore structure-activity
relationships? Once the chosen research meth-
odology has been implemented, a method of eval-
uation will be employed to measure the results.
If the project is the development of a new tech-
nology, will the potential social impact be mea-
sured? If so, will a cost-benefit analysis be used,
and will that analysis measure adequately the
effects on human health and safety?
Finally, a decision will be made regarding the
dissemination of research results, involving a de-
termination of not only who will be told, but also
how they will be told, and how much. For instance,
if it appears that a new technology will have dan-
gerous or undesirable side effects, will this fact
be made known to those who will use or are
affected by the technology?
In an ideal world, each of these decisions would
be made after careful analysis of the academic
and social merit of all of the available options.
Within the modem university, however, a number
of other factors enter and, in fact, often do tip
the balance toward one option or another. What
are the incentives that motivate university re-
searchers? Without attempting to compile an ex-
haustive list, I can identify five major factors:
[a] Genuine Interest. All other things being
equal, it can be assumed that an academician
would prefer to pursue those projects in which
she or he is most interested. The key factors here
are personal bias, viewpoint, and curiosity.
(b) Availability of Funding. The pursuit of
research usually requires financial support. Faced
with a choice among competing projects, the re-
searcher will often be constrained to choose the
one for which there is adequate funding.
[c] Desire for Future Funding. A related con-
straint is the academician's need to maintain a
flow of funding for future projects. A researcher
will feel an incentive to choose among research
alternatives on the basis of whether they will
enhance or ensure the availability of future
funding.
(d) Formal Status within the University. In-
stitutional success within the university is com-
monly measured by ability to rise in formal prom-
inence within the institution. Thus, to the extent
that tenure status, teaching arrangements, or de-
partmental status will be influenced by the nature
and direction of an individual's research, he or
she may see an obvious incentive to make research
decisions that could maximize formal status within
the university.
(e) Academic Reputation. A related and final
constraint is the desire to be in good "academic"
standing with one's peers, not only at home, but
also in the wider national and international ac-
ademic community. Research direction, meth-
odology, and results clearly influence how work
is viewed by a researcher's contemporaries.
Industry funding can affect each of these major
research incentives.
The Control of Incentives Through
Commercial Funding
AT&T has made a major investment ... in very
high grade economic talent over the past decade.
It is not entirely accidental that this group of
economistshas produced a formidable new theory
ofmultiproduct natural monopolythat mayserve
as a powerful argument in favor of barriers to
entry and the exclusion of competitors in AT&T
markets. The only other apparent beneficiary of
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the normative implication of this theory is the
postal service."
This statement comes, not from an outspoken
critic of industry's role in the university, but from
Bruce Owen and Richard Braeutigam, two uni-
versity professors, sympathetic to industry, who
have written what they term a "how-to" manual
for corporate business. They have seized upon a
critical point: that industry can, in their words,
"coopt the [academic] experts" and control the
direction and content of academic research. Their
suggestion of how this should be done is all the
more disturbing for its dispassionate tone:
This is most effectively done by identifying the
leading experts in each relevant field and hiring
them as consultants or advisors, or giving them
research grants and the like. This activity requires
a modicum of finesse; it must not be too blatant,
for the experts themselves must not recognize
that they have lost their objectivityand freedom
of action.P
The mechanisms of control are rarely this clearly
articulated; nor, one would hope, are the com-
mercial motivations so callous. It must be rec-
ognized, though, that industry funding justifiably
tends to move the incentives for research in the
direction that would profit its shareholders.
The Mechanics of Influence
The potential for redirection of university research
can be seen from even a rudimentary examination
of the effect of commercial funding on the in-
centives outlined above. The key to such an anal-
ysis is an understanding of the interrelationship
among the incentives. One incentive feeds and
enhances the other, and vice versa, until the overall
effect is substantial. Predictably, the cycle begins
with the first extension of a funding offer to the
university. Imagine a bright young university bi-
ologist, interested in developing new in vitro tests
for mutagenicity because of the possible social
benefits. He finds, however, that adequate funding
for this project is not easily obtained. When his
department chairman advises him that the uni-
versity has entered into a multimillion dollar
contract with a corporate funder to produce pat-
entable work in genetic engineering and he is
invited to join the research team, he finds it dif-
ficult to decline.
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Two important factors are at work here. On
the one hand, of course, the academician has gone
to where the money is. As a result, the direction
of his research will be that desired by the com-
mercial funder. He also has done that which pleases
his department chairman. Spurred on by new-
found academic activity, he may become less and
less interested in returning to his original in vitro
mutagenesis project. At some point, he may pursue
bioengineering research, not out of obligation, but
out of genuine interest. And then, even though
this researcher is pursuing the research he wants
to undertake, there may be a loss in academic
freedom of the university, because his original
research ideas are no longer being pursued there.
Diversity is lessened.
Other examples are also instructive. Take the
case of a toxicologist who has reason to believe
that two chemicals could be significant human
carcinogens, but who has the resources to pursue
a study of only one. If she knows that chemical
A is manufactured by a company that is about
to give a large technology/development grant to
her university, and that chemical B is not, will
her choice be unaffected by that fact? Is it not
fair to say that fear of upsetting a potential funder
may provide an incentive to investigate B rather
than A?
Or take the case of a university epidemiologist
hired by a manufacturer to investigate occupational
cancer at its factories. Suppose that the manu-
facturer has supported technological research at
the university and that both sides feel that a good
working relationship has developed between them.
What incentives play upon the epidemiologist's
choice of study design and evaluation method-
ology? If the manufacturer also is seeking to avoid
the imposition of a stringent OSHA regulation,
then the manufacturer's preferences in the out-
come of the research are clear. The epidemiologist
will be aware of that fact, and of the benefit to
his position at the university of pleasing a major
funding source. If he has done work on a number
of industry contracts, he may also have developed
something of an industrial viewpoint. These factors
may affect the way he approaches the project or
presents the results.
This is not to say that he is likely to falsify
his results. Blatant falsification remains a rare
occurrence. There may, however, be some incen-
tive to choose a study design that is less likely
to reveal a positive correlation between worker
exposure and disease. If, for example, he follows
the health status of workers for only a few years
after exposure, he may not detect diseases, such
as cancer, with long latency periods. Or, even if
his data indicate a possible correlation between
disease and exposure, he may choose a relatively
insensitive method of statistical analysis to eval-
uate those data, and thus reach an inconclusive
result. If the results are inconclusive, then bias
may be introduced in the manner in which they
are presented to the public. And it is here that
differences in perspective become important. A
report may indicate that the data are insufficient
to determine whether or not the industrial ex-
posure causes cancer, or it may indicate that the
data contain no evidence of increased cancer mor-
tality for the particular exposure. Obviously, the
manufacturer in question would prefer the latter
description of the research results. Experience in-
dicates that incentives move in this direction. On
the other hand, a toxicologist in the same uni-
versity may be asked by a firm to determine, prior
to its being marketed and a large capital investment
made, whether a new chemical is carcinogenic.
Here, all the incentives work in the direction of
discovering carcinogenicity, if it exists. The firm
wants to avoid a later discovery of toxicity.
These examples demonstrate the importance of
examining the effects of industrial funding on a
case-by-case basis. It would be just as inappropriate
to conclude that, simply because a firm has com-
mercial interest in the outcome of research, the
research will necessarily compromise academic
freedom, as it would be to presume the opposite.
Conclusion
Universities are not repositories of neutral com-
petence. The choice of research is influenced by
a variety of factors including intellectual cu-
riosity, personal values, financial reward, academic
peer-group pressure, and political preferences. The
preservation of the university as a place dedicated
to "free inquiry" must entail not only the safe-
guarding of individual academic freedom wherever
possible, but also the encouragement of variety
in research directed toward a diversity of goals.
True "balance" is impossible to define. Vigilance
in examining whether the profile of university
research retains a diversity of interests and views
is essential. As industry responds to changing social
and market demands, industry and society, as well
as the university, would benefit from this diversity.
NOTES
1. Samuel S. Epstein, The Politics of Cancer, revised
edition (New York: Anchor Books, Anchor Press/
Doubleday, 1979).
2. Barbara J. Culliton, "Academe and Industry Debate
Partnership," Science, Volume 219 (14 January
1983): 150-151.
3. E. E. David, Ir., "Striking a Bargain Between Com-
pany and Campus," Environment, Volume 24,
Number 6 (July/August 19821: 42-45.
4. Ibid.
5. "Grace Funds Microbiology Research," (MIT) Tech
Talk (11 August 1982): 4.
6. Barbara J. Culliton, op. cit.
7. Everett Carll Ladd, [r., and Seymour Martin Lipset,
The Divided Academy (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., Inc., 1975), see especially Chapter 3.
8. E. E. David, Jr., op. cit.
9. Colin Norman, "Electronics Firms Plug Into the
Universities," Science, Volume 217 (6 August 19821:
511-514.
10. Annual Science and Technology Report to the
Congress: 1981 (Washington, DC: Office of Science
and Technology Policy in cooperation with the
National Science Foundation), p. 47.
11. "Paiaro Dunes Biotechnology Statement," (MIT)
Tech Talk, Volume 26, Number 31 (7 April 1982).
12. Wil Lepkowski, "Corporate/University Ties Grow-
ing Stronger," Chemical and Engineering News (3
January 1983): 32-33, describing the conference,
"Partners in the Research Enterprise: A National
Conference on University-Corporate Relations in
Science &. Technology," held at the University of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 14-16 December 1982.
Ashford: Industrial Funding &. Academic Freedom 23
13. "Pajaro Dunes Biotechnology Statement," op. cit.
14. A. Bartlett Giamatti, "The University, Industry,
and Cooperative Research," Science, Volume 218
(24 December 1982): 1278-1280.
IS. David F. Noble and Nancy E. Pfund, 'The Plastic
Tower: Business Goes Back to College," The Nation
(20 September 1980): 246-250; Testimony by David
F. Noble, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Sci-
ence, Research, and Technology, Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Represen-
tatives, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 16-17 June
1982 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1982). See also David F. Noble, "The Chem-
istry of Risk: Synthesizing the Corporate Ideology
of the 1980s," Seven Days (5 June 1979): 23-26,
34; and David F. Noble, "Academia, Inc.," Science
for the People [Ianuary/Pebruary 1983).
16. Wayne Biddle, "A Patent on Knowledge," Harper's
(July 1981): 22-26.
17. Memo from the Academic Freedom Committee to
the Board of Directors of the American Civil lib-
erties Union entitled, "Revision of Policy 64: The
University and Contract Research," 24 September
1982.
18. "Grace Funds Microbiology Research," op. cit.
19. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revo-
lutions (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
1962).
20. Wi! Lepkowski, "Public Concern: New Force in
Science Policy," Chemical and Engineering News
(26 March 1982): 43-44.
21. Bruce M. Owen and Ronald Braeutigam, The Reg-
ulation Game (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing
Company, 1978).
22. Ibid.
